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6.4. DOCTRINAL LESSONS
Doctrine
, guidance on how to fight most effectively, is vital to success in war.
Iraq possessed a large, modern air force, but the lack of doctrine nullified their
combat power. The Coalition's air doctrine, on the other hand, enhanced the US
forces effectiveness. Nevertheless, several major
doctrinal lessons
have emerged.
Because airpower has unique characteristics of speed, range and power that
together provide an unmatched flexibility, it should be considered
indivisible
. Over
the decades airpower has tended to split into strategic and tactical camps. This
division is artificial. It is not the nomenclature of the aircraft that matter, but the
objectives sought and targets struck. The air commander must use the assets most
appropriate to achieve his objectives, whether they be bombers, fighters or cruise
missiles launched from a ship.
The second fundamental principle of air doctrine was the importance of
air
superiority
. It is difficult, if not impossible, for an army to survive once it has lost
control of the sky above it. Air superiority is not generally an end in itself but an
enabler that allows other land, sea and air missions to operate effectively. Air
superiority gained in the first days of Desert Storm, against one of the most heavily
defended areas in the world, allowed Coalition forces to maneuver, deploy, resupply,
stockpile and fight where and when they wanted and granted the aircraft a safety and
freedom that permitted operations at high and medium altitudes with virtual
impunity. By the end of the war the Coalition was actually flying combat training
missions over enemy territory. We may thus witness a new phenomenon: the battle
for air superiority may determine the outcome of a war.
Another important doctrinal lesson was the importance of the
unified
command
of air assets. Airmen have long argued that in order to maximize
airpower's flexibility it must be centrally controlled. This concept has been resisted,
and there was no overall air commander in either Korea or Vietnam. The problem of
fragmented command structure made it difficult for airpower to concentrate efforts
and was corrected only in 1986. Then joint doctrine established the Joint Force Air
Component Commander (JFACC), an airman from any service who would control all
the air assets of a joint force and focus them to meet the theater commander's
objectives. Desert Storm was the first war to employ a JFACC, and this unity of
efforts ensured smooth coordination and an efficient use of Coalition air assets and
allowed the conduct of strategic, operational and tactical level air campaigns
simultaneously.
6.5. TECHNOLOGY LESSONS
Technology has always been closely linked to airpower, and in this war high-
tech air weapons dominated. For years, critics maintained the emphasis on
technology was misguided and that the equipment would not work in combat. This
war proved the opposite. Several categories of air weaponry made the victory
possible.
