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Stealth technology
works better than most had anticipated. The F-117 was the
premier strategic bomber of the war, striking over 30% of the targets during the first
two days and all the targets in Baghdad throughout the war; yet it comprised less than
3% of the air assets. The F-117 drew the most difficult targets because of its near
invulnerability: not one aircraft was lost or even sustained battle damage. It is likely
the Iraqis never knew it was overhead until the bombs impacted. In one sense, the F-
117 combat employment has returned airwar to the days before radar.
Another important technological innovation is
precision guided munitions
(PGMs). PGMs have contributed to the efficiency of airwar by reducing the number
of bombs needed to neutralize a target. The laser and television guided bombs of the
Coalition seldom missed, even though the Iraqis made extensive use of camouflage,
deception and decoys. Precision reduces the large number of sorties needed. The
ability of PGMs to penetrate and destroy hardened targets was so impressive that
concrete may become obsolete.
Electronic warfare
(EW) was another advance used extensively in the Gulf
War. Specialized aircraft like the EA-6B 'Prowler' were used to either jam or actively
destroy Iraqi air defenses. The jammers confused enemy radars or prevented
communications between Iraqi interceptors and their ground controllers. In addition,
F/A-18s and other aircraft carried antiradiation missiles that homed on radar
emissions. These missiles were so effective that Iraqi defenders were afraid to turn on
their radars for fear they would immediately be targeted and destroyed. As a result of
EW operations, the Iraqis were largely unable to see or react to air strikes.
For decades, airmen have attempted to strip away the
protection of darkness
from the enemy, and in this war Coalition airpower owned the night. Systems such as
FLIR, LANTIRN, and night vision goggles allowed airmen to acquire and attack
targets easily both by day and night.
Intelligence
was of crucial importance in Desert Storm. It has long been a
truism that the key to airpower is targeting, and the key to targeting is intelligence.
This war demonstrated that linkage. If a PGM is now capable of hitting a specific
office in a large headquarters complex, then intelligence must know the correct
office. The inability to eliminate entirely the Iraqi nuclear research capability was a
failure of intelligence, not execution.
The Gulf War seems to indicate we are moving into a new era in warfare. Past
centuries have been dominated by ground and sea forces; the 21st century will be
dominated by air forces.
6.6. EXERCISES
1. Ответьте на вопросы.
1.
What is the air theorists' point of view concerning airpower's unique abilities?
2.
What is a doctrine? Could you illustrate its importance?
3.
What are the major doctrinal lessons of the Gulf Airwar?
4.
Why airpower should be considered indivisible?
5.
Why air superiority is of vital importance?
